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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BANKERS' EMBEZZLPMENT-DEFINITION OF INSOLVENcY-Appellant was indicted for and convicted of the crime of embezzlement in fraudulently receiving a deposit at a time when the bank, of
1
which he was president, was insolvent. He appealed, alleging that the trial
court erred in instructing, in effect, that a bank is insolvent when the actual
cash market -value of its assets is not sufficient to pay its depositors on demand or in the regular course of business. Held, judgment reversed.2
The court, in reversing the judgment, held that this instruction was erroneous. It said "a bank is solvent if the fair cash value of all the assets
of the bank, on the particular day in question, realizable within a reasonable time, by reasonably prudent persons, would be equal to or in excess
of the total liabilities of the bank, exclusive of stock liability." The opinion
pointed out that there are two definitions of the term "insolvency'--a narrow one, which the trial court adopted, and the broad one which the Supreme Court approved. The court was able to cite a considerable amount
of authority for the view it took, and to point out that most of the cases
in which the narrow view was adopted were not criminal cases. It was
further suggested that it would be poor policy to put bankers in the position
in which the law, so construed, would place them. In the light of the general rule of restricted construction of criminal statutes,& and the considerations employed by the court, it can hardly be doubted that the result
reached was the correct one.
But is the statute under which the appellant was convicted, even so construed, constitutional? It is submitted that a recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court casts grave doubt upon its validity.4 This statute
provides that it shall be a felony for any officer or employee of a bank to
fraudulently receive a deposit at a time when the bank is insolvent. It
then provides that the failure, suspension or involuntary liquidation of the
institution within thirty days after the receipt of such a deposit shall be
prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud. Is such a presumption constitutional under the due process clause?
Until 1910 the power of the legislature to create statutory presump5
In that year,
tions seems to have been unchallenged in the federal courts.
however, the Supreme Court of the United States laid down the rule that
any statutory presumption in which there is no rational connection between
the fact proved and that inferred is void as a contravention of the due
process clause. 6 This proposition has been reiterated many times since
I Sec. 2479 Burns' Indiana Statutes, Revision of 1926.

2 Smith v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, June 23, 1932, 181 N. E. 519.
3Branarn v. State (1929), 200 Ind. 575, 165 N. E. 314; Pruasian v. Unitec
States
(1931), 282 U. S. 675, 51 Sup. Ct. 223.
4
Manley v,. Georgia (1929), 279 U. S. 1, 49 Sup. Ct. 215.
5Keeton W. Page, Statutory Presumptions, 10 Texas Law Review 34 (1931).
a Mobile, J. d Ir. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed (1910), 219 U. S. 35, 31 Sup. Ct. 136.
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that date and must now be considered settled law.7 An analysis of the
problem will reveal that this is a rule with much merit. The power of the
legislature in such matters depends upon the balance of social interests. It
can not create a statutory presumption unless the social interest behind
such a rule is greater than the conflicting social interests. No presumption
which is entirely arbitrary and which is not based upon a rational connection can be due process of law, for any social interest which is advanced by
such a rule is clearly outweighed by the social interest in a fair administration of justice. It might be said that even an arbitrary presumption has
some benefits in that it may be a convenient divide, and may speed up the
machinery of the judiciary. But surely, justice-the ultimate purpose of
the judiciary-cannot be made subordinate to mere convenience. In the
case of Ferr v. Ramseys the Supreme Court held that the legislature has
the power to create any presumption, without regard to its being reasonable,
if it would have the power to impose the same liability where the presumed
fact did not exist. The sounidness of this doctrine is to be doubted. When a
law containing such a provision is passed, the legislature is imposing the
liability upon the ultimate fact-not upon the fact from which the presumption is made to arise. If the ultimate fact is to be arbitrarily presumed,
the legislature is really imposing the liability upon a mere presumption. It
is difficult to see how this can be due process, especially in a criminal case,
where the state must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.9
In the case decided since Ferry v.'Ramey the general rule has been laid
0
It might well be condown without any reference to this qualification.'
tended that these decisions impliedly overrule Ferry v. Ramey.
But even if the rule of that case is accepted, it has no effect upon the
principal case. It could hardly be contended that the legislature, under the
due process clause, would have the power to declare the mere fact of receiving a deposit during insolvency a crime, in the absence of criminal intent, fraud, or such an exact definition of the state of insolvency that the
banker could know when he was breaking the law.
It seems, therefore, that section 2479 of Burns' Indiana Statutes is unconstitutional unless a rational connection exists between the fact to be
proved and that to be inferred-that is, a rational connection between the
fact that a bank has closed within thirty days after a deposit was received,
and the fact that such deposit was received with an intent to defraud. It
is difficult to determine just how much connection there must be. So far,
the Supreme Court has never adopted any particular test, so the only
method of determining the question is to compare the facts of the cases
which the Supreme Court has passed upon with the facts of the case under

7
Baileyi v. Alabama (1911), 219 U. S. 219, 31 Sup. CL 145; McFarlandV. American Sugar Co. (1916), 241 U. S. 79, 36 Sup. Ct. 49S; Hawes v. Georgia (1922), 258
U. S. 1, 42 Sup. Ct. 204; Yee Hem v. United States (1925). 268 U. S. 178, 45 Sup. CL
470; Western 1?. R. v. Henderson (1929), 279 U. S. 639, 49 Sup. Ct. 445; Bandini
Petroleuru Co. v. Superior Ct. (1931), 52 Sup. Ct. 103.

277 U. S. 88, 48 Sup. Ct. 443.
Fritz v. State (1912), 178 Ind. 463, 99 N. E. 727.
'),Manley v. Georgia (1929), 279 U. S. 1, 49 Sup. CL 215; Western R. R. v. Henderson (1929), 279 U. S. 639, 49 Sup. Ct. 445; Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct.
(1931), 52 Sup. CL 103.
8 (1928),
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consideration. In Manley v. Georgia,11 a statutel2 very similar to the one
under which the appellant was convidted was held unconstitutional. That
statute provided that "every insolvency of a bank shall be deemed fraudulent, and the directors shall be severally punished * * *; provided that
the defendant * * * may repel the presumption of fraud by showing
that the affairs of the bank have been fairly and legally administered."
The statute then defines "insolvency," adopting a definition quite similar to
the one set out by the trial court in the principal case. The Supreme Court
said that this statute contravened the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the presumption was arbitrary in that there was not
a rational connection between the fact to be proved and that to be inferred.
It was pointed out that proof of any one of the conditions described as
insolvency would, under such a statute, give rise to a presumption of fraud.
It is submitted that the court could not consistently hold that there is
not sufficient connection between the fact of insolvency so defined, and the
fact that such insolvency was caused by fraud, and at the same time say
that there is enough connection between the fact that a bank has closed
within thirty days after the receipt of a deposit, and the fact that such
deposit was received with fraudulent intent. It is true that the Indiana
court in the principal case repudiated the definition of insolvency contained in the Georgia Statute. But under the Indiana statute it is not the
fact of insolvency which gives rise to the presumption, but the fact that
the bank suspends within thirty days after the deposit has been received.
An examination of the Indiana banking laws will show that the banking department, in which is vested a great deal of discretion, can close a bank
because of the existence of the very conditions described as insolvency in the
Georgia statute and held to be insufficiently connected with fraud by the
United States Supreme Court.'3
W. H. H.
INTOXICATING

LIQUOR-TRANSPORTATION-SUFFICIENCY

OF EVIDENCF--

When officers first saw the, appellant, he was standing by the side of an
automobile and Gambino was repairing a tire. When the officers returned,
the appellant and Gambino drove away. Later, when the appellant was
arrested, he was riding in the car with Gambino, the confessed owner thereof, in which there was found hidden from view one hundred and thirty
gallons of liquor, which was being transported. Appellant was tried and
convicted in the circuit court of Cass county on a charge of transporting
liquor under the Indiana statute.' Appellant appealed, assigning as error,
the overruling of his motion for a new trial, by challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the conviction. Held, evidence was insufficient
2
to support the conviction.
Evidence showed that appellant was an Italian by birth, who has resided
in Grand Rapids for almost four years and at the time of the arrest was a
hitch-hiker on his way to Indianapolis to look for work, when he was per- (1929), 279 U. S. 1, 49 Sup. Ct. 215.
2Sec. 28, Art. 20, Georgia Banking Act

"See

of 1919.

See. 3965, Burns' Indiana Statutes, 1929 Sup.
23Burns' 1. S. (1926), See. 2720.
2
Iinpellizeri v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, June 10, 1932.

